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ABSTRACT: "Risk" and the "legal system" are ambiguous terms.
Here they are clarified, then considered from the standpoint of the
objectives, methods, and problems of legal intervention in a world of
inevitable risk.
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T HE terms &dquo;risk&dquo; and &dquo;legal sys-tem&dquo; are ambiguous, so let us
begin by clarifying our topic.
THE MEANING OF &dquo;RISK&dquo;
Traditionally &dquo;risk&dquo; has referred to
the chance or probability that some
(usually undesirable) event will oc-
cur, with the word &dquo;gravity&dquo; used to
describe the event’s consequences. In
current practice, however, &dquo;risk&dquo; is
taken to mean an expected value ar-
rived at by multiplying consequences
by the probability that they will oc-
cur. So, for example, we might say
that the risk of some chemical is that
its introduction into the marketplace
will result in an expected cost of one
excess death per year, that is, one
more death per year than is experi-
enced in the chemical’s absence. Be-
hind this statement there might be
evidence suggesting, say, that if the
chemical is used, there is a one-in-
one-thousand chance of one thousand
extra deaths annually
So &dquo;risk&dquo; expresses something
both about probabilities and about
consequences. It is worth noting here
that consequences are regarded in
very different ways by experts, on the
one hand, and laypeople, on the
other. We shall consider the signifi-
cance of these differences later.
THE MEANING OF
&dquo;LEGAL SYSTEM&dquo;
Laypeople tend to think of the le-
gal system as comprising only courts
and judges. Actually, though, the sys-
tem includes legislative and execu-
tive (administrative) bodies as well.
Indeed, legislatures (including the
U.S. Congress) and administrative
agencies (including the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency) play a more
significant role than do the courts with
respect to many contemporary prob-
lems, including the problem of risk.
THE PROBLEM OF RISK:
OPTIMAL RISK
What, precisely, is the problem of
risk, at least from the standpoint of
the legal system? Commonly, we use
the word &dquo;problem&dquo; when we mean
there is too much of something (like
rain during a deluge) or too little (like
water during a dry spell). So is the
problem of risk a problem of too much
risk or a problem of too little?
Strangely enough, on this question
there are two schools of thought.
Many people, educated laypeople in
particular, think we experience too
much risk in our daily lives. The risk
of cancer, the health and environ-
mental risks of new technologies, of
contaminated landfills, and so on are
commonly thought to be too high, too
great. At the same time, however,
there are other people-they tend to
be people with considerable scientific
training-who conclude that we
have, in a way, too little risk.’ How
can that be?
Consider the idea of optimal risk,
which is to say, just the right amount.
The right amount of risk-the right
amount of safety-might seem like a
strange notion, but notice in this con-
nection that when people say there is
too much risk, they are usually also
1. See Clayton P. Gillette and James E.
Krier, "Risk, Courts, and Agencies," University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, 138:1027, 1070-
86 (Apr. 1990). 2. Ibid., pp. 1032-36.
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saying, implicitly, that some lesser
amount would be tolerable or per-
haps even desirable. Not many of us
want zero risk (absolute safety), and
those of us who think we do can usu-
ally be talked out of the idea, for a
very simple reason: zero risk or abso-
lute safety is impossible to achieve. It
is risky not to have some measure of
risk or danger in society.
Consider as an example the risk of
cancer from a new drug. That risk is
a disadvantage of the drug, but pre-
sumably the same drug has advan-
tages also (if it does not, then, of
course, it should not be introduced
into the marketplace). Suppose the
drug guards against a serious disease
more effectively than does the exist-
ing stock of drugs. If society decides
that the drug is not to be used be-
cause it is risky, the cost of that deci-
sion is the incidence of disease that
could have been reduced had the drug
been employed; if the drug is used,
the cost of that choice is an increase
in the incidence of cancer. Should the
drug be used or not?
Quite clearly, it depends on a com-
parison of the relevant risks and
benefits. Since both risk and the ab-
sence of risk can be costly, what soci-
ety should try to do is minimize the
sum of the costs of risk and the costs
of avoiding risk. In the case of our
hypothetical drug, we want to ap-
prove the drug if the disease it helps
cure is more serious than the in-
crease in cancer that comes with the
cure, and disapprove it otherwise. To
express the idea in dollar terms, we
want every dollar we spend on avoid-
ing risk to yield a benefit larger than
that dollar. Put differently, we want
every dollar of risk that we introduce
to be offset by at least one dollar of
some other risk avoided.
If this notion still sounds conten-
tious, consider that it guides every-
body’s everyday activities. It is risky
to cross the street, to drive a car, to
fly in commercial (let alone private)
aircraft, to eat peanut butter (a natu-
ral carcinogen), to have children. Yet
we do cross the street, drive, and so
forth, and with even less than perfect
care, because giving up such activi-
ties, or even being very, very careful
in how we conduct them, is at some
point worse-more risky-than the
alternative, a cure worse than the
disease.
Now we can clarify the reason that
some people, scientific experts in par-
ticular, tend to think we have too
little risk. What they are saying is
that society in general has irrational
fears of new technologies and syn-
thetic drugs and so on. Most such
innovations, in the view of many ex-
perts, reduce old (background) risks
in amounts greater than the new
risks they introduce. Nuclear power,
for instance, is certainly risky, but
pollution from fossil-fueled power is,
in one view, riskier yet, especially
given the threat of global warming. If
so, then nuclear power is the less
risky of the two (necessarily risky)
alternatives and also less risky than
a world without power. (One would go
on, of course, to consider other alter-
natives as well, such as solar power
and hydropower, but few authorities
believe that either or both of these
are a sufficient power source.)
In sum, it seems clear enough, on
a moment’s reflection, that an opti-
mal amount of risk-neither too little
nor too much but always some-is
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the appropriate objective. The prob-
lem of risk arises not so much in this
connection but from the fact that peo-
ple-laypeople versus experts in par-
ticular-disagree in given cases
about where the greater risk lies.
MORE ON THE PROBLEM
OF RISK: MARKET FAILURE
It is instructive to ask why market
forces-considerations of supply and
demand-do not effectively control
risk. The market, after all, sees to it
that, by and large, we do not have
way too many tomatoes or too few, too
much steel or too little. So why too
much risk or too little?
This is an issue that economists
discuss in terms of so-called exter-
nalities, meaning costs and benefits
of activities that for some reason a
relevant actor fails to take into ac-
count. For example, when a steel
company makes steel, it considers
the cost of inputs into the manufac-
ture of steel: the cost of raw materials
like iron and coal, the cost of operat-
ing the mill, the cost of labor, and so
on. What the company is unlikely to
consider, however, unless forced to do
so, is another cost of making steel: air
pollution and its adverse effects on
neighbors of the steel mill. Air pol-
lution is costly, and it is a necessary
cost of making steel. If the company
neglects that cost, it is likely to make
too much steel, more than would
be worthwhile were the costs of air
pollution figured in, rather than
left external to the steel company’s
deliberations.
How to force the company to con-
sider the cost of air pollution? The
cost of iron it considers because the
iron mines charge a price that has to
be paid; so too for the coal, for elec-
tricity, for labor. Suppliers of these
inputs will provide them only if pay-
ment is made, and they will withhold
them otherwise; the price forces the
steel mill to consider the costs of its
decisions to others. But who in the
marketplace can withhold the air from
the steel mill’s pollution? Air is some-
thing the company can take without
paying, so it neglects the fact that air
pollution imposes costs upon society
In short, in the case of inputs like
air and peace and quiet and, in our
case, safety, the unregulated market
might, in a word, fail.
THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION
IN THE RISK MARKET
It is this problem of market failure
that generally justifies intervention
to control environmental pollution
and also to control risk. Notice that
not all kinds of risk require control
outside the market. Chain saws
might be risky, but we can count on
consumers, given some instruction
and common sense, to use them with
due care-because the costs of care-
lessness will be visited on the con-
sumer ! But noise from chain saws is
quite another matter. True, users of
chain saws will consider the noise
from the standpoint of their own in-
terests-it can be easily avoided with
earplugs and the like-but they
might well ignore the interests of by-
standers, who also value peace and
quiet.
To deal with this noise problem,
regulations have been instituted that
require mufflers and other noise con-
trols, whether producers and con-
sumers want them or not, just as we
see regulations that deal with the
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risks of pollution. These regulations-
these instances of intervention-are
provided through the legal system.
THE OBJECTIVES
OF INTERVENTION
Perhaps the chief objective of legal
intervention in the risk market has
already been suggested. If the ideal
is an optimal level of risk, and if the
unregulated marketplace ordinarily
fails to yield this level, then the ob-
jective is to intervene in such a way
as to achieve appropriate degrees of
risk in the society Where there is too
much risk, deterrence is necessary;
where there is too little, the objective
is encouragement. Both amount to
risk management, the purpose of
which, ideally, is to minimize the sum
of risk costs and risk avoidance costs.
Management is not the only objec-
tive, however. As much as we might
try to manage risk wisely, there will
be instances where risk falls, inap-
propriately, on victims. People can be
risk victims simply because they are
exposed to threats they should not
have to endure: they might have to
live, for example, knowing that one of
their parents used a drug that can
have serious negative effects on off-
spring, at some probability People-
and environments and so forth-can
be risk victims because some threat
eventually manifests itself: a drug
that threatens to cause cancer actu-
ally does result in the disease in some
drug users; a chemical that threatens
to pollute the environment actually
does enter, say, a body of water. As to
these actual consequences, deter-
rence is beside the point because the
harm has already occurred. But com-
pensation is possible. Victims can be
awarded money or other goods and
services to help provide for their loss;
environments can be restored. More-
over, compensation bears a relation-
ship to deterrence. If risk producers
know that they will be liable for com-
pensation to victims, the producers
will tend to take that obligation into
account in deciding how to do their
business-they have an incentive to
take due care. If victims know they
have a right to compensation, they
will have an incentive to enforce that
right by bringing lawsuits, the threat
of which, in turn, provides incentives
for care on the part of producers.
THE MEANS OF
INTERVENTION
As already suggested, society can
and does draw on various legal insti-
tutions to manage risk and provide
compensation. Putting the matter in
the most general terms, it can resort
to the courts, legislative bodies, and
administrative agencies at both the
state and federal levels.
Our focus here is on the courts,
though we shall consider legislative
and administrative activity toward
the end of our discussion.’
RISK AND THE COURTS
Courts in the United States play
two different sorts of roles in the
regulation of risk. One role is to over-
see administrative agencies to en-
sure that the agencies fulfill regula-
tory responsibilities prescribed by
legislation. For example, the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund might
claim that the Environmental Pro-
3. These matters are covered in more de-
tail in other articles in this volume.
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tection Agency is not properly enforc-
ing the laws regulating hazardous
waste sites and sue the agency in
federal court, asking the court to in-
struct the agency to proceed as di-
rected. This, for our purposes, is a
secondary judicial role that we will
consider, but only briefly, in our later
discussion of legislative and adminis-
trative activity
The way the courts play a primary
role is through what is called the law
of torts, and here several kinds of
lawsuits are of interest. First, risk
victims might go to court seeking
compensation (damages) from a risk
producer, claiming that the producer
acted unlawfully in a way that
harmed victims. An example would
be a claim that a factory let toxic
chemicals seep into groundwater,
leading eventually to health prob-
lems for neighbors.’ Alternatively,
victims might seek damages not for
actual physical injuries but on the
ground that the factory’s operations
have unlawfully exposed them to the
threat-the risk-of future injuries.
For a variety of reasons, these
sorts of lawsuits are troublesome for
the courts. They commonly involve
technical and scientific complexities
thought by many to unduly tax the
courts’ capacities and also the vic-
tims’ capacities. Generally speaking,
victims must prove the risk pro-
ducer’s wrongdoing and the resulting
injuries, meaning that the victims
must show these things to be &dquo;more
probable than not&dquo; (that is, a proba-
bility greater than 50 percent). Be-
cause of the uncertainty that sur-
rounds modern risk problems, this
burden of proof can be daunting.
Moreover, there is the problem of just
what injury the risk producer caused.
Say some victims get cancer. They
might have gotten cancer in any
event, at some probability. Should
the risk producer be liable for all the
cancers that resulted, more probably
than not, from its activities and for
none of the other cancers, even
though there might be a 49 percent
chance that those cancers resulted
also from the producer’s activities?
On this question the courts-and the
experts-differ.5 5
The problem under discussion be-
comes even more difficult when vic-
tims seek compensation for risk
alone, without manifested injury.
Suppose a risk producer’s activities
result in a 20 percent increase in the
expected number of cancers in a
given area over the next 30 years
(there will be 120 rather than 100). A
50 percent cutoff (based on the more-
probable-than-not standard) would
deny the award of damages in all
cases, meaning too little compensa-
tion and too little deterrence. Yet, if
the producer were required to pay for
all 120 cancers, it would be held liable
for cancers it did not cause. There
would be too much compensation and
deterrence. A contentious-and, to
date, barely used-solution to this
problem is to hold the producer liable
for the additional 20 percent risk it
creates for everyone, whether anyone
gets cancer or not.6
4. Instead of or in addition to seeking
damages, risk victims might ask for injunctive
relief, a court order that the risk producer
abate its risky activities. See Richard A. Epstein,
Cases and Materials on Torts, 6th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 714-15.
5. Ibid., pp. 487-88.
6. See Glen O. Robinson, "Probabilistic
Causation and Compensation for Tortious
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At present, it is not at all clear how
to resolve debates about the forego-
ing matters. People, mostly laypeo-
ple, who tend to think society is too
risky would wish the courts to err in
the direction of enhanced liability,
whereas others, mostly experts, who
believe we seek irrationally high lev-
els of safety would want them to err
in just the opposite direction. Given
the great uncertainty surrounding
the actual facts of the matter, one
might believe that the general ques-
tion is a political one, best solved by
a political body like the legislature,




On this issue, too, the picture is
murky, and we can see why by dwell-
ing on the courts for just another
moment.
Consider the obvious, that it is ex-
pensive for risk victims to bring law-
suits in the courts. Given this, it
might well be that many victims do
not find it worthwhile to proceed, the
result being (again) too little compen-
sation and deterrence. If risk is
spread rather thinly over thousands
(or more) of people, there could be
huge aggregate risk costs that are
never brought to bear on risk produc-
ers through the courts.
One might at first regard this as a
powerful motivator for legislative
and administrative intervention, but
again the matter is complicated.
Most contemporary political theo-
rists think that legislative and ad-
ministrative bodies are driven to a
significant degree by political pres-
sures of various sorts. Political pres-
sure, in turn, is largely a product of
the ability of constituents to orga-
nize. If, then, risk producers are bet-
ter organized than risk victims, legis-
lative and administrative measures
will go too easy on the producers; if
victims are the better organized, the
opposite is likely to hold.
Consider now that just as risk vic-
tims might not find it worth their
while to bring costly lawsuits, so they
might not find it worth the effort to
organize political activity. The per
capita stakes are usually relatively
small, and in any event each victim
will tend to reason that if other risk
victims campaign for legislative and
administrative protection, then pas-
sive victims will benefit as well. For
example, legal measures that require
safer workplaces will mean safer con-
ditions for all employees, not just for
those who helped to get the legal mea-
sures enacted. Finally, the experts in
administrative agencies probably
tend to disagree with the common lay
view, mentioned earlier, that there is
too much risk. The experts will look
at expected mortality and morbidity
statistics and see that many modern
technologies are relatively safe.
Laypeople, on the other hand, will
look beyond the expected mortality
and morbidity numbers at, for exam-
ple, the worst possible case that could
result in the event of a mistake. Nu-
clear power might look safer, on aver-
age, than fossil-fueled power, but at
the same time a nuclear accident
might be much worse than an acci-
Risk," Journal of Legal Studies, 14:779 (1985);
Bill Charles Wells, "The Grin Without the Cat:
Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure With-
out Present Injury," William & Mary Journal of
Environmental Law, 18:285 (Spring 1994).
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dent at a conventional power plant.
Laypeople tend to focus on these
worst-case possibilities and on other
features of high technology that ap-
pear to be threatening.
A model like this suggests that just
as the market and the judicial system
might provide too little protection to
victims, so, too, will the legislative
and administrative systems. In this
view, we should err, as with the
courts, in the direction of enhanced
protection. But opponents say we
have already erred too much. They
look at the large stock of legislative
and administrative risk protection
regulations in place and conclude that
society has gone too far. It spends far
too much money guarding against
evils so unlikely to materialize as to
be trivial. The opponents therefore
urge legislative and administrative
bodies to back away from stringent
controls, in the name, ironically, of
greater safety In addition, they urge
courts, when they are called on to
review the actions of legislative and
administrative bodies, to have more
respect for expert views about how
much safety is enough and what kind
of safety is best.
Which, again, is the right outlook?
Modeling exercises suggest, to me
anyway, that over the long run, soci-
ety will regulate too little. Hence it
should tend to err, systematically, in
favor of enhanced liability in court
and in favor of stringent legislative
and administrative regulations. At
the same time, however, it is a fact
that the courts are often very hard on
modern technology and that the ex-
isting legislative and administrative
controls are oftentimes amazingly,
perhaps foolishly, stringent.’ Figur-
ing out whether we are anywhere
near the optimal point seems an al-
most foolhardy exercise.
So what do we do? There is consid-
erable evidence that the legal system
(or any other system) responds to un-
certainty by stumbling along, mak-
ing guesses some of which are right
and some wrong, learning from mis-
takes, stumbling on again, and so on.
Problems are resolved by trial and
error, by &dquo;muddling through.&dquo;’ This
method works well enough if the
costs of mistakes are not too terribly
high, but that condition becomes
harder and harder to satisfy. Modern
technology has an enormous capacity
to make life on the planet better but
also, in the worst case, to cause cata-
strophic losses. In such a situation,
the legal system, and society in gen-
eral, should pursue the prudent path.
Unhappily, however, just what is pru-
dent will often become clear only with
experience, and the experience itself
could prove very costly.
7. The reasons for this, having to do in part
with the so-called salience of certain kinds of
risk threats, are considered in other parts of
this volume.
8. See Gillette and Krier, "Risk, Courts,
and Agencies," pp. 1107-8.
